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Abstract 
In this final part of our series of essays we discuss the consequences of our earlier stated hypotheses that in 
times of well-being the logic of appropriateness prevails among both the constituencies and their political 
representatives, while in times of crisis constituencies resort to the logic of arguing, and leaders 
predominantly use the logic of consequences with some admixtures of the logic of arguing. Over a longer 
term we expect a gradual shift from the logic of consequences toward the logic of arguing in times of crises. 
However, we do not expect that such a shift necessarily leads to a greater societal problem-solving capacity, 
since self-referential communicative processes may lead to what we call “communicative bubbles”. Yet, we 
also argue that societies developing more deliberative strands of democracy have significant potential to 
come close to the condition of distributed reflexivity, characterized by the fact that each member of a society 
is able to start or join a discussion on any issue of his or her concern, to exercise his or her reasoning freely, 
and to make up his or her mind on any such issue, taking into account, when doing so, that other people 
have equal capacities and equal rights to do the same. We conclude that a plurality of deliberatively 
democratic societies have significant potential to develop genuine problem-solving capacities, and not merely 
communicative bubbles. 
 
Keywords: political philosophy, deliberative democracy, distributed reflexivity, logic of appropriateness, logic 
of arguing, logic of consequences 
                                                          
1The ordering of the authors follows alphabetical order and does not indicate any priorities. 
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1. Introduction 
In the previous two parts of this series of essays we have argued that the median voter theorem 
does not provide an appropriate description of a complex interplay between the agency of constituencies 
and their political representatives. At the systemic level we have proposed the “competence fields 
approach” as the one capturing the main features of the more complex dynamics. We have also attempted 
to integrate the competence fields approach with a micro-level description of political phenomena, which 
led us to consider different types of logics characterising different types of rationality of political actors 
under different contextual conditions. 
In particular, we have begun to investigate how different types of logics become prominent under 
different contextual conditions of economic well-being and crisis, respectively. We have argued that in 
times of well-being the logic of appropriateness prevails among both the constituencies and their political 
representatives, while in times of crisis constituencies resort to the logic of arguing, and leaders 
predominantly use the logic of consequences with some admixtures of the logic of arguing, and we have 
identified this gap between different types of arguing as a source of the current crisis of the political 
systems in Europe. 
 
 
2. Longer-Term Dynamics 
Now it seems to be the right time to ask how the unfolding of such dynamics over longer time 
periods looks like. What are its systemic implications? This refers back to the feedback cycle between 
political actors and political attitudes outlined in the first part of this series of essays. Obviously, we can 
expect a growing importance of both the logic of consequences and the logic of arguing in times of 
economic crisis, while in times of recovery and relative well-being we can expect a moderate retreat toward 
the logic of appropriateness. Thus, somewhat paradoxically, we can relate cycles of increased economic 
activity and growth with predominance of relatively “passivist” logic in political sphere,2 whereas the more 
“activist” types of logic seem to gain importance during economic downturns.3 
There are indications, however, that over a long term we can expect a gradual shift from the logic 
of consequences toward the logic of arguing in times of crises.4 Elster (1995, p. 257, emphasis in original) 
refers to “a multiplier effect of impartiality, by which the presence of some genuinely impartial actors may 
force or induce self-interested others to behave as if they, too, were swayed by such motives”. This 
becomes possible since even one’s rhetorical commitment to values opens the way for other (perhaps truly 
committed) actors to hold this actor accountable for complying to the proclaimed values. 
Elster (1995, p. 246) provides an example of a well-off advocate breaking taxes for the well-off, and 
only for them, and supporting such a decision with a universalist-style argument that this policy will have 
beneficial effects for all by a trickle-down effect. However, such a move has minimal chances to withstand 
counter-arguments pointing to other possible policies that would have more direct beneficial effects for all, 
                                                          
2 Such “passivist” logic is often reflected in the narratives of “the end of history”, “the world beyond antagonism” and other 
similarly optimistic visions of a harmonious, consensual society. Moreover, we can speculate that “passivism” in political spheres 
can be one of the very causes of the impending economic decline. 
3 The more “activist” logic is often reflected in the views of society as inherently adversarial, antagonistic, and conflictual (e.g. 
Schmitt, 1932; Mouffe, 2005). Mouffe (2005, p. 121) argues that “democracy requires a ‘conflictual consensus’: consensus on 
the ethico-political values of liberty and equality of all, dissent about their interpretation”. However, even if an overarching 
reasoned consensus is not possible, the logic of arguing, when applied in political struggles, does have its strengths, as we shall 
demonstrate shortly. 
4 That is, we can roughly expect a somewhat higher importance attached to the logic of arguing in each successive crisis cycle. 
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such as breaking taxes for all, without exceptions. In other words, as soon as impartial arguments are 
invoked, even if only rhetorically, it nevertheless becomes increasingly demanding to foist off partial 
interests under the guise of impartiality.5 
Thus, as Risse (2000, p. 9) observes, “argumentative processes might well begin as purely 
rhetorical exchanges but often evolve toward true reasoning”. This occurs because “speakers need to 
respond to each other’s arguments. They cannot simply repeat their utterances, if they want to convince a 
skeptical audience, but need to come up with ever more sophisticated justifications”. Theorists of 
deliberative democracy underline opening “the constellation of discourses... to dispersed and 
communicatively competent popular control” (Dryzek, 2000, p. 15) as one of the crucial preconditions for 
deliberation. Searching for ever more sophisticated justifications may be one of the mechanisms by which 
such control becomes possible. 
It is the multiplier effect that we may expect at work between constituencies and elites during times 
of crises, with the constituencies gradually swaying elites toward the logic of arguing and greater axiological 
rationality. It must be stressed, however, that the evolution of strategic rhetorical moves toward true 
reasoning is probably slow and unfolding in a two-steps-forward-one-step-back manner.6  
The emergence of bizarre politicians, discussed in the first part of this series of essays, can be 
regarded as part of such oscillations. For example, the slogan: „Everything to me, nothing to you!“ can be 
regarded as a desperate attempt to come to grips with excesses of instrumental rationality. Ridiculous as it 
is, such slogan, however, does not only make fun. It also brings to the fore the unacceptability of “might is 
right” ruling style, which is all too often exercised in daily politics. The sarcastic tone of the slogan invites 
the audience to reflect, for a moment at least, about the unacceptability of such ruling style, which is 
probably the first step toward articulating (possibly strong) reasons for this unacceptability, toward 
persuading others at the strength of those reasons, and thereby toward further contestation of such ruling 
style.7 Consequently, although in a somewhat circumscribed way, even this ridiculous slogan has the 
potential to make some rather contentious issues more prominent in public discussions. 
Returning to Elster’s example, note that the advocate’s proposal to break taxes for most, but not 
all, who are well-off, and for some of the worse-off as well, might be generally more acceptable than 
reducing taxes for the well-off only. Elster’s general point is that arguments that deviate enough from the 
self-interest of the proponent, but not so much that nothing is gained, have better chances to become 
accepted than supposedly impartial arguments that fit too well with one’s self-interest. We can only add that 
when power differentials are significant, as in the case of elites vs. constituencies, it becomes even easier 
for the more powerful side to perform various rhetorical manoeuvres under the guise of impartiality.8 The 
                                                          
5 In the previous parts of this series of essays we have repeatedly emphasised that the notions of “good”, “fair”, “legitimate”, etc. 
are contextually dependent. In accordance with such a view, whenever we use terms such as “impartiality”, “general interest”, 
“true reasoning” and the like, we assume the meaning of these terms which is acceptable to the most of the members of a 
society in a given moment, i.e. the meaning which can be justified by strong reasons, under the given contextual conditions. 
6 For example, the processes of abolition of slavery, introduction of universal suffrage, achieving gender equality, and many 
others that can be considered in the context of arguing between elites and non-elites, have all been slow and gradual. Note, 
however, that they have also been irreversible, if viewed on a sufficiently long-time scale (Boudon, 2001). 
7 On the process of articulating good reasons in public, from the perspective of the deliberative democracy model, see Benhabib, 
1996b, pp. 71-72. 
8 Economic crisis, in particular, can serve as an excuse for elites to push for various restrictions on democratic processes and for 
downward revision of democratic rules, principles and rights (Mastropaolo, 2012, pp. 24–25). Moreover, deterioration in 
employment and living conditions undermines the potential for collective action and political involvement of constituencies 
(Mastropaolo, 2012, pp. 60–61). Mastropaolo (2012, p. 67) also notes that “it is likely that leftist forces undervalued the 
opportunities for redistribution of the resources of power that would become available to the entrepreneurial and financial millieux 
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possible spectrum of strategic manoeuvres is very large, as there are numerous possible fields of 
competence and the elites may in any time attempt to divert public attention from discussions of their 
leadership competences toward some other fields (e.g. ethnicity, abortion, same-sex marriage, etc.), where 
competence claims can be more easily established within the given context. All in all, in the presence of 
large asymmetries of power,9 one obviously cannot expect an overly rapid transition from strategic rhetoric 
to true reasoning. 
However, how does the logic of arguing unfold its persuasive power? Following Boudon (2001), it 
can be expected to be based in strong reasons. To gain relevance in public discourse these need to be 
intersubjectively valid. These assumptions are unproblematic. However, as it has been emphasised in the 
theory of securitisation, the roots of intersubjective validity are to be found in contextual conditions: namely, 
how the subject is historically, institutionally or discursively “sedimented” (Williams, 2003). Referencing 
such sedimented items may become a self-referential process. This is of consequence for the question if 
and how the self-organised feedback cycle between political attitudes and political actors truly  generates a 
problem solving feedback cycle (comp. Figure 1 in our first essay). It may well solve ecological problems, 
generate economic prosperity or peaceful international relations. Numerous examples can be found: the 
emergence of “green” political movements and parties has brought ecological problems to the political 
agenda in the 1980s. The New Deal was a successful answer to the global economic crisis in 1929 and 
after the catastrophe of World War II a peace system has been established in which the European Union 
fundamentally changed the European inter-state relations. These are examples of successful problem 
solving.    
However, there is no “logical” guarantee that the multiplier effect of argumentative processes will 
necessarily generate a problem solving feedback cycle: numerous examples exist in which the logic of 
arguing generated public perception of public problems that can be called “communicative bubble”. In 
analogy with “speculative bubbles”, the term “communicative bubble” denotes a self-referential 
communication process, i.e. a communication in which the validity of an argument is based on prior 
arguments and not on other sources of evidence such as face validity. Here, the contextual conditions are 
crucial: the intersubjective plausibility of arguments needs to be built up on various sources of 
sedimentation of arguments. This does not need to result in a convergence to some kind of truth that can 
be measured in objective terms. As an absurd example, by arguing people could agree that the solution to 
– say – oil crisis would be – say – a prayer at Stonehenge. While this is not sedimented in current 
discursive practice, numerous historical examples can be found that the discursive feedback cycle turned 
out not to be a truly problem solving one: to mention just one, in 1892 there was a juridical process in 
Germany against a Jew who was accused of murdering a child. In this process even the prosecutor argued 
that the accused man was not guilty. But this did not help the poor man who became the subject of an 
invidious media campaign. This could be related to a widespread discursive sedimentation of anti-Semitism 
in Germany around 1900. In turn, this discourse could rely on a historical sedimentation of anti-Semitism 
within the European and Christian tradition. For instance, the media campaign against this Jew could build 
on a medieval suspicion toward Jews, which portrayed them as people who drink blood of Christians for 
ritual purposes. This is just one small example. The reader may think of others. However, being part of 
history, only the history itself can show what kind of political action and discourse will emerge as true 
problem-solving and what will turn out to be a mere communicative bubble.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
to the cost of their constituencies” and that the leftist forces, in fact, often succumbed to the rhetoric of political and economic 
elites. In all probability, one needs to be very careful in order not to underestimate the power of elites’ strategic rhetorical moves. 
9 Far from an “ideal speech situation”, or from the presuppositions of “discourse ethics” (cf. Habermas, 1983). 
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3. On the (anti-)political character of the model 
Although this may sound like an oxymoron, it can be said that our model is “anti-politically political”. 
It is “political” since it conceives of political agency, in the sense of attempts at establishing political actors’ 
competences in front of audiences, as a fundamental feature of social life. However, it is also “anti-political” 
in that it predicts, with time and particularly in times of crisis, increasing difficulties for political actors to 
ground their competence claims in anything other than strong reasons, which would be acceptable to their 
audiences. In particular, the model predicts that the capacities of political actors to keep constituencies 
from realising what the latter would normally regard as their own “true interests” would gradually diminish 
with time due to multiplier effect of impartiality.  
The model converges toward a state of “perfect meritocracy” in which it would be impossible to 
claim competences that cannot be publicly verified. Note that this condition would arise not because people 
are exceptionally “good-hearted”, or “highly moral”, but due to a simple fact that any claim of unverifiable 
competences would immediately provoke reasoned counterclaims that would prevent success of such 
“political projects”. In other words, this ultimately “anti-political” condition, which we shall call “democratic 
utopia”, would grow out from its own “political” roots. 
Two caveats should also be added at this point. First, we do not claim that the condition of 
democratic utopia would ever be reached. It is quite possible that the process of convergence would 
continue without ever reaching the equilibrium. 
Second, as we have already suggested, even reaching the condition of democratic utopia need not 
imply that societal problem-solving capacities at such a stage would be anywhere close to perfect, at least 
not in the sense of “problem-solving” as it is conceived in contemporary Western culture. The prospect of 
communicative bubbles looms large. It is possible to imagine a society happily indulging in free and 
unconstrained communication amplifying what would appear to an external observer as nothing more than 
collective delusions. Hence the issue of reaching democratic utopia and the issue of problem-solving seem 
to be largely independent of each other. 
 
 
4. What about distributed reflexivity? 
The main difference between the model outlined in this series of essays and the model of 
deliberative democracy – or better to say, a family of deliberative democracy models, since there are subtle 
differences between them10 – is that our model is descriptive, while the latter are normative. However, 
deliberative democracy models fit well with our theoretical framework since they prescribe conditions that 
would quicken the convergence of our model toward the ideal state of “democratic utopia”.  
We shall call the basic precondition of deliberative democracy models “distributed reflexivity” – that 
is, the condition in which each member of a society – i.e., each potential political actor – is able to start or 
join a discussion on any issue of his or her concern, to exercise his or her reasoning freely, and to make up 
his or her mind on any such issue, taking into account, when doing so, that other people have equal 
capacities and equal rights to do the same. As an important special case, each member of a society is free 
to claim competence on any matter of concern, but each claim of competence is, at the same time, subject 
to thorough public scrutiny.  
                                                          
10 See, e.g., Benhabib (1996a) for an overview. 
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It is important to note that the reflexive capacity is distributed, i.e. this capacity cannot be entirely 
ascribed to a single actor. It is the feedback generated by an initial claim or proposition that is capable of 
developing the problem solving capacity of a society, not the logic of arguing confined to an isolated mind 
of an individual actor. The argumentative feedback augments the reflexive ability of an individual and 
provides an opportunity to articulate further arguments in response, without ever losing from view, the 
interlocutor as a moral and political equal. In such a way, by living together and providing reasons to each 
other, we become collectively more reflexive as a society11. 
As we have already noted, significant power differentials characterise all contemporary 
democracies (cf. Mansbridge, 1996). Yet, if all citizens were to have “the same chances to initiate speech 
acts”, “the right to question the assigned topics of conversation”, and “the right to initiate reflexive 
arguments about the very rules of the discourse procedure and the way in which they were applied or 
carried out” (Benhabib, 1996b, p. 70), then “rhetorical action” (Risse, 2000; following Schimmelfennig, 
1997) and “strategic uses of argument” (Elster, 1995) would have less chances to succeed, while the 
multiplier effect of impartiality could be expected to work more effectively. In other words, the convergence 
toward democratic utopia would speed up.12 
Here is, perhaps, once again the place to warn against putting too much faith in smooth and rapid 
convergence occurring naturally by itself.13 In the words of Claus Offe (2013, emphasis in original): “While 
(...) projects of making democracies more democratic clearly deserve great social scientific attention and 
imaginative experimentation, political theorists should also look into the social conditions under which 
interest and political preferences are formed before they are voiced. After all, new procedures may not be 
sufficient to increase and broaden participation by citizens unless the supply of public policies and its 
‘possibility space’, as perceived by citizens, is prevented from becoming ever more restricted...” Using the 
vocabulary of this series of essays, we can say that we are thus referred back to the questions of historical, 
institutional and discursive contextual sedimentation “under which interest and political preferences are 
formed before they are voiced”. For example, if “policy-making moves to other sites that are typically out of 
reach of the participant agents of normal democratic politics” (Offe, 2013), then one can hardly expect 
strengthening of deliberative democracy and convergence toward democratic utopia. 
At this point we should also remark that we do not feel an urge to ground deliberative democracy in 
any absolutely valid procedures. In our view, which naturally follows from our general approach elaborated 
in this series of essays, the chances of deliberative democracy to succeed within a particular cultural 
tradition will be highest if its procedures are justified by strong reasons grounded in local contextual 
conditions. We believe that in most contemporary cultures one can find historical, institutional, discursive 
and other sediments conducive to development of a compelling case for at least a variant of deliberative 
democracy – that is, a variant that would betray neither the main idea of establishing legitimacy through 
                                                          
11 The notion of distributed reflexivity extends the argument set forth in Neumann and Cowley (2013) that the development of 
individual rationality is a distributed process. Rather than being a property of individuals, rationality is a property of language 
enacted in Wittgensteinian language games. Theories of bounded rationality demonstrate the incomplete capability of biological 
humans to enfold cultural standards of rationality. Here the argument is extended to the domain of political discourse, by 
emphasising that the reflexivity of societies is a distributed phenomenon.   
12 Cohen (1996, p. 107) makes a similar point: “...ensuring that all citizens have effective political rights serves as a reminder that 
citizens are to be treated as equals in political deliberation, and, by reducing inequalities of power, reduces the incentives to shift 
from deliberative politics to a politics of bargaining”. Since “deliberative politics” corresponds to the logic of arguing and “a politics 
of bargaining” corresponds to the logic of consequences, this is to say that reducing inequalities of power by granting equal 
political rights will reduce the incentives to use the logic of consequences in place of the logic of arguing. 
13 See also footnote 8. 
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public deliberation, nor the basic “reciprocal moral recognition of one another’s claims to be participants in 
the moral-political dialogue” (Benhabib, 1996b, p. 79).14 In other words, we believe that the general 
framework of deliberative democracy is wide enough to allow for “a weak plural agreement, to which each 
side could assent for different reasons” (Bohman, 1995, p. 269, emphasis in original).15, 16 
If different cultures can find different strong reasons for adopting the principles of deliberative 
democracy, this would mean that different ways of approaching democratic utopia can be taken. If these 
different approaches and their corresponding sources of argumentative sedimentation would be mutually 
accessible and if different cultures could crossfertilise each other’s experiences, this could lessen the 
chances that each particular culture remain locked into communicative bubbles. In particular, we expect 
that, under conditions of cultural exchange based on principles of mutual moral respect and reciprocity 
similar to those guiding interpersonal exchanges under deliberative democracy model,17 individual actors 
could get acquainted with fresh ideas that could be tried and further explored within their own cultural 
contexts. All this being taken into account, we can conclude that cultural exchange could make 
development of problem-solving capacities, both within and across various cultures, more likely. 
Now we should also be able to address the question figuring in the main title of this series of 
essays: Do political actors and political attitudes constitute distributed reflexivity? As should be clear by 
now, we do not believe that any society, not even the so-called “most advanced democracies” currently 
satisfy this requirement (cf. Mansbridge, 1996). However, according to our view, democratic societies, and 
particularly societies developing more deliberative strands of democracy, have significant potential to come 
close to the condition of distributed reflexivity. Moreover, as we have argued, a plurality of deliberatively 
democratic societies have significant potential to develop genuine problem-solving capacities, and not 
merely what we have called “communicative bubbles”. 
 
 
5. Outlook  
The current crisis of European democracy provided a motivation to call the principles of political 
action and communication into question. How is it possible that in many European countries bizarre quasi-
politicians gain public support?  
                                                          
14 For example, one can imagine that the slogan: „Everything to me, nothing to you!“ can invite the audience to reflect about the 
unacceptability of “might is right” ruling style in most cultures. This is, of course, not yet a compelling case for deliberative 
democracy, but it indicates that different cultural contexts are at least similar enough to sustain reflection on the meaning of 
equality, power, coercion, justice, etc. 
15 In Benhabib’s (1996b, p. 79) formulation: “What is distinctive about the discourse [i.e., deliberative democracy] model is that 
although it presupposes that participants must recognise one another’s entitlement to moral respect and reciprocity in some 
sense, the determination of the precise content and extent of these principles would be a consequence of discourses 
themselves”. As we understand, such open-endedness of the deliberative democracy model is compatible with Bohman’s notion 
of “weak plural agreement”. 
16 An example of a weak plural agreement (although not entirely deliberatively democratic) from recent international politics is the 
case of American non-intervention in Syrian civil war. Various parties have various reasons for the non-intervention: the U.S. are 
not eager to intervene for fear of “another Iraq”, Russia and China oppose the intervention primarily because they do not like to 
see American display of power, and most of other countries oppose the intervention for fear of additional collateral damages and 
casualties. The confluence of these different reasons leads to the same outcome, i.e. the non-intervention. 
17 It is important to note that such plurality of deliberatively democratic societies communicating with mutual moral respect and 
reciprocity can be regarded as satisfying the requirement of distributed reflexivity on a higher, i.e. societal, level. In other words, 
distributed reflexivity is a condition that should ideally hold at all levels of aggregation: individual, group/associational, and 
societal. 
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We have argued that the logic of argumentation can be dissected by referring to Boudon’s (2001) 
cognitivist model of instrumental and axiological rationality as a framework for the analysis of political 
communication. However, in contrast to controlled procedures e.g. in science, in political communication 
the roots of intersubjective validity of strong arguments can be found in contextual conditions. Here, it is 
essential how much a topic is entrenched: how much a topic is institutionally, discursively or historically 
“sedimented”. By recourse to Risse’s (2000) typology of argumentation this can be brought into a dynamic 
framework. This allows to identify a crisis mechanism – namely a divergence of argumentative logic of 
constituencies and political actors in times of crisis. While political actors should exhibit a tendency to 
favour the logic of consequences, the constituencies tend to prefer the logic of arguing. We presume that in 
the long run, this process will tend toward the logic of arguing. However, the roots of intersubjectivity of 
strong arguments in political communication do not allow for a definite answer on whether this will generate 
problem-solving communication or mere communicative bubbles.   
In future work, the inherent dynamics described here should be analysed by means of a simulation 
model that would be developed for this purpose. This can be implemented building upon the framework 
outlined by Cioffi-Revilla and Rouleau (2010) and Markisic, Neumann and Lotzmann (2012). Such a model 
would allow for a more rigorous treatment of the long-term dynamics and a detailed study of the crisis 
mechanism. While simulation studies of the long-term dynamics of the interplay between political actors 
and political attitudes can be envisioned to inform primarily theoretical research, empirical research would 
benefit from closer integration of quantitative and qualitative studies. A comparative view on political 
attitudes might be deepened by opinion polls such as Eurobarometer and sharpened by means of 
quantitative analyses. Analyses of political actors, on the other hand, call for predominantly qualitative 
studies, such as discourse analyses of politicians’ speeches. 
In any case, democracy is not a project fixed once for all times. It is “an imperfect human invention” 
(Mastropaolo, 2012), an ongoing process that needs to be analyzed as such. As we have argued in this 
series of essays, this process continues, among other ways, through endless claims and counterclaims to 
competence in various matters of public concern, set forth by various political actors in front of various 
audiences. With this process coming closer to the condition of distributed reflexivity, the prospects that 
democracy become a “more perfect human invention” will be brighter. 
 
 
Acknowledgement 
We would like to thank the three anonymous reviewers for helpful advice and constructive comments. An earlier 
version of the material contained in this series of essays was presented at the European Conference on Political Attitudes and 
Mentalities, Bucharest, September 2–5, 2012. We gratefully acknowledge “distributed reflexivity” emerging from comments and 
discussions on that occasion.  
 
 
References 
1. Benhabib, S. (ed.) 1996a. Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political, Princeton, Princeton 
University Press. 
2. Benhabib, S. 1996b. Toward a Deliberative Model of Democratic Legitimacy, in Benhabib, S. (ed.), Democracy and 
Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political, Princeton, Princeton University Press, pp. 67–94. 
3. Bohman, J. 1995. Public Reason and Cultural Pluralism: Political Liberalism and the Problem of Moral Conflict. 
Political Theory, vol. 23, no. 2 (May), pp. 253–279. 
4. Boudon, R. 2001. The Origin of Values: Sociology and Philosophy of Beliefs, New Brunswick, NJ, Transaction 
Publishers. 
  
European Quarterly of Political Attitudes and Mentalities  EQPAM  
Vol.2, No.4, October 2013 
                      ISSN 2285 – 4916                      
        ISSN-L 2285 - 4916 
Open Access at  https://sites.google.com/a/fspub.unibuc.ro/european-quarterly-of-political-attitudes-and-mentalities/ Page 63 
5. Cioffi-Revilla, C., Rouleau, M. 2010. MASON RebelLand: An Agent-Based Model of Politics, Environment and 
Insurgency. International Studies Review, vol. 12, no. 1 (March), pp. 31–52. 
6. Cohen, J. 1996. Procedure and Substance in Deliberative Democracy, in Benhabib, S. (ed.), Democracy and 
Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political, Princeton, Princeton University Press, pp. 95–119. 
7. Dryzek, J. S. 2000. Deliberative Economy and Discursive Legitimacy. Paper presented at the conference on 
Deliberating about Deliberative Democracy, University of Texas, Austin, Texas, 4–6 February 2000. 
8. Elster, J. 1995. Strategic Uses of Argument, in Arrow, K., Mnookin, R. H., Ross, L., Tversky A., Wilson, R. (eds.), 
Barriers to Conflict Resolution, New York, Norton, pp. 236–257. 
9. Habermas, J. 1983. Moralbewußtsein und kommunikatives Handeln, Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp. 
10. Mansbridge, J. 1996. Using Power/Fighting Power: The Polity, in Benhabib, S. (ed.), Democracy and Difference: 
Contesting the Boundaries of the Political, Princeton, Princeton University Press, pp. 46–66. 
11. Markisic, S., Neumann, M., Lotzmann, U.  2012. Simulation of Ethnic Conflicts in Former Yugoslavia. Proceedings of 
the 26th European Conference on Modelling and Simulation ECMS 2012, pp. 37–43. 
12. Mastropaolo, A. 2012. Is Democracy a Lost Cause? Colchester, ECPR Press. 
13. Mouffe, C. 2005. On the Political, London and New York, Routledge. 
14. Neumann, M., Cowley, S. 2013. Human Agency and the Resources of Reason, in Cowley, S., Vallée-Tourangeau, F. 
(eds.), Cognition Beyond the Brain, Berlin, Springer, pp. 13-30.     
15. Offe, C. 2013. Democracy in Crisis: Two and a Half Theories about the Operation of Democratic Capitalism. Accessed 
online on August 12th, 2013 at url <http://www.opendemocracy.net/claus-offe/democracy-in-crisis-two-and-half-
theories-about-operation-of-democratic-capitalism>. 
16. Risse, T. 2000. “Let’s Argue!”: Communicative Action in World Politics. International Organization, vol. 54, no. 1 
(December), pp. 1–39. 
17. Schimmelfennig, F. 1997. Rhetorisches Handeln in der internationalen Politik. Zeitschrift für Internationale 
Beziehungen, vol.1, no. 2 (December), pp. 357–366. 
18. Schmitt, C. 1932. Der Begriff des Politischen, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin. 
19. Williams, M. C. 2003. Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics. International Studies 
Quarterly, vol. 47, no. 4 (December), pp. 511–531. 
